No matter the constitutionality of adult sex offender registration-and on that point, there is debate-this Article argues that juvenile sex offender registration violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. "Once a sex offender, always a sex offender" is not an appropriate slogan when dealing with children who commit sexual offenses. Low recidivism rates and varied reasons for the misconduct demonstrate that a child's criminal act does not necessarily portend future predatory behavior. And with a net cast so wide it ensnares equally the child who rapes and the child who engages in sex with an underage partner, juvenile sex offender registration schemes are not moored to their civil regulatory intent.

Compounding the problem is automatic hfetime registration for child offenders. This Article analogizes this practice to juvenile sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida. It argues that mandatory lifetime registration applied to children in the same manner as adults is cruel and unusual punishment because it violates fundamental principles that require sentencing practices to distinguish between adult and child offenders.
Scrutiny of child sex offender registration laws places front and center the issue of what it means to judge our children. And on that issue, we
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine if you were held accountable the rest of your lfe for something you did as a child?
That is what happened to Leah,' who at ten years old, "flashed" her eight and five-year-old stepbrothers and simulated the sex act with them while they were fully clothed. 2 Growing up in another generation, Leah's actions may have been considered "playing doctor," 3 but not by today's standards. Leah was convicted of criminal sexual conduct' and placed on the state's public sex offender registry when she was twelve years old. 5 The Child Scarlet Letter, if you will. 6 In her college blog, Leah detailed the impact that sex offender registration has had upon her life. Not surprising, it has included loss of college internships, difficulty in finding a place to live, bullying from dorm mates, and loss of employment. 7 No matter her acts of volunteerism or her level of education, Leah will be required to remain on the state registry until she is thirty-seven years old. 8 Even after she is no longer required to register, Leah will still have to contend with the lasting vestiges of Internet public notification. This is because information disseminated via the Internet is really not possible to delete. It is forever "etched in cyberspace." 9 And Leah must endure these hardships all because of an act she committed when she was ten years old.
For other child offenders, the consequences can be more devastating.
laws/story?id=14171897&page=2 (recounting the harm done to juvenile registrants). In her college blog, Leah refutes the charges that were leveled against her. See DuBuc, supra note 1. 3. "Playing Doctor" is a term coined to describe children's exploration of each other's genitals and is considered by child psychologists as a normal occurrence among young children. See, e.g., Is Your Preschooler Playing Doctor?, FAMILY EDUCATION, http://life.familyeducation.com/sexuality/toddler/53839.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (acknowledging normal sexual curiosity among children); see also Genital Play: What's Normal, What's Not, ASK DR. SEARS: THE TRUSTED RESOURCE FOR PARENTS, http://www.askdrsears.com/topics/child-rearing-anddevelopmeht/sexuality/genital-play-whats-normal-whats-not (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (offering criteria for which sexual play is normal and which sexual play is not); Jose I. Concepcion, Understanding Preadolescent Sexual Offenders, 78 FLA. B.J 30, 33 (July/Aug. 2004) ("Sexual play by developing children-'playing doctor'-is normal and not a cause for concern.").
4. For ease of readability, this Article uses the term 'convicted' and 'adjudicated' interchangeably in discussing a child offender's adjudication of delinquency.
5. See Moore, supra note 2 (reporting that Leah's request to be placed on a nonpublic registry was denied by the court because her offense was aggravated by the fact that one of her stepbrothers was more than five years younger than she was at the time of the alleged incident); see also , available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us09O7webwcover.pdf (detailing the lingering impact of registration laws on a ten year old boy who sexually abused his six year old sister).
6. The 'scarlet letter' refers to Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel by the same name, published in 1850, involving an adulterous relationship between a married woman and a young minister, for which the heroine is forced to wear a scarlet letter around her neck upon discovery of the affair. See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (New York, Fleet Press Corp. 1969) (inviting the reader to criticize the Puritanical practice of shaming the adulteress).
7. DuBuc, supra note I (describing the effect of public notification on her life). J.L.'s treatment is not unique. Registry rolls are filled with children who commit voluntary, but presumed criminal, sexual acts with other minors and who, because of those acts, are required to register as sex offenders. 20 Characterizing J.L.'s act as an aggravated sexual offense is best understood against the backdrop of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which Congress enacted in 2006 as part of a comprehensive system of sex offender registration and notification.21 SORNA reclassified registration, dividing offenders into three categories or "tiers" based solely on the crimes they committed. 2 2 Rather than assessing an offender's future dangerousness on an
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7 (2013) (providing that "[i]f the victim is at least thirteen
years of age and the actor is less than five years older than the victim, the actor is guilty of a Class I misdemeanor"); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(F) (2013) (allowing a defense to sexual conduct with a minor if "the defendant is under nineteen years of age or attending high school and is no more than twenty-four months older than the victim and the conduct is consensual").
For a comparison of Romeo and Juliet to teenagers having consensual sex today, see Steve James, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call For
Reform, 78 UMKC L. REV. 241, 241 (2009) ("While the idea of Romeo and Juliet being prosecuted as sex offenders may seem absurd, the reality is that it has happened and could happen to many modem teens.").
18. See generally Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 341 (2003) (tracking states with less stringent punishment where the age differential between perpetrator and victim is less than three or four years). For an example of a state statutory rape statute with age differentials, see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.436(a)(1) (2013) (charging as a Class B felony sexual abuse of a victim who is between thirteen and fifteen by one who is at least seventeen years of age); ALASKA STAT. §I 1.41.440(a)(1) (2013) (charging as Class A misdemeanor sexual abuse of a victim who is under the age of thirteen by one who is less than sixteen years old). individualized basis, SORNA requires that the conviction alone determines the registrant's classification, and from that classification flow the burdens associated with registration and notification. 23 Not only did SORNA change the classification of offenders, the federal scheme also subjected child sex offenders in the juvenile justice system to the same registration and notification burdens as their adult counterparts. 24 Interestingly, although SORNA only mandated registration for those fourteen years or older, states have passed sex offender registration laws requiring children far younger to register. As an incentive for states to implement the program, SORNA dictated a loss of federal funding in the event a state failed to comply with the requirements. 26 Adult and child registrants also face ever-changing and increasingly harsh registration rules, and should they relocate to another state, they must navigate conflicting registration schemes at the risk of penalties for the failure to register. 28 Consider Jacob C., who at eleven years old committed a sexual act against his younger sister. He touched her genitals. 29 Because of that act, Jacob lost his freedom; he was placed in 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (defining the term "convicted" to include "adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense"). For an interesting story on one person who pushed for national juvenile registration, see Moore, supra note 2 (highlighting the story of Amie Zyla, age 18, who advocated for the release of information pertaining to child offenders).
25.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § .26(a) (West 2012) (declaring that when a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for a violation of one of the enumerated offenses, "and the juvenile was at least eleven years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the court shall consider whether the juvenile is a danger to the community," and if so, the court may require the juvenile to register); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-502(10) (2013) (stating that a "sexual or violent offender" includes any person who, in youth court, has been found to have committed or been adjudicated for a sexual or violent offense, which demonstrates no differentiation in the treatment of juveniles and adults); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.34(15m)(1) (West 2013) (indicating that a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for any violation, solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt to commit any enumerated violation may be required to comply with the same reporting requirements as adults if the court determines that there was an underlying sexual motivation). It is an obvious truth that children are different from adults. Indeed, the juvenile justice system is based on that premise, and recent Supreme Court decisions have highlighted those differences in holding that juveniles are not deserving of the death penalty 37 or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 3 8 Yet, under the federal mandate of SORNA, these differences are ignored. Children are treated like their adult counterparts, forced to endure harsh registration 3 9 and notification burdens 40 not contemplated by the juvenile justice system. 4 1 This Article asserts that child registration and public notification run counter to the prevailing and fundamental policies of rehabilitation and http://inthesetimes.com/article/6334/barely_ateenagerandmarkedforlife (describing the struggle faced by a registrant who was required to register for life on Iowa's public sex offender registry because at thirteen years old, he told his four-year-old cousin to expose herself).
26.
37. subdiv. 6(d) (2013) (asserting that a person must register for life if he has been adjudicated delinquent for any enumerated offense for which registration is required and he has a prior adjudication for an offense for which registration was required).
40. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8404 (2013) (declaring that the Idaho state police shall establish and maintain a separate registry of juvenile sex offenders including registrants' fingerprints, photographs, and other information, which "is subject to release to criminal justice agencies pursuant to section 18-8305, Idaho Code, and to the public pursuant to section 18-8323, Idaho Code"); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 62F.260 (2012) ("The records relating to a child must not be sealed pursuant to the provisions of NRS 62H.100 to 62H.170, inclusive, while the child is subject to registration and community notification as a juvenile sex offender pursuant to NRS 179D.010 to 179D.550, inclusive."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-508(3) (2013) (stating that " [d] issemination to the public of information allowed or required by this section may be done by newspaper, paper flyers, the internet, or any other media determined by the disseminating entity," and that the disseminating entity should consider the offender's level of risk to the public); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(2) (2013) (noting that "[t]he department shall maintain a registry of all persons subject to sub. (1g)" including the person's name and all aliases, date of birth, gender, race, height, weight, hair and eye color, the address of the person's residence, email addresses, name and address of the person's employment, and the name and location of the person's school, among other information).
41. See infra Part II.B (describing the clash of policies between SORNA and those in the juvenile justice system). confidentiality of the juvenile justice system. 42 Even if one were to argue that child offender registration satisfies important policy considerations of public safety and protection of child victims, the automatic nature of child registration does not. The current model of "conviction based assessment" required under SORNA
43
-where the nature of the conviction determines future dangerousness of the actoris unsound when applied to child offenders because their commission of sex crimes does not necessarily portend predatory behavior."
It is not just the nature of automatic registration that causes concern. Depending on the triggering offense, a child offender might also be subjected to mandatory registration for life. 45 No doubt, there are hurdles to overcome in arguing that child sex offender registration is cruel and unusual punishment. Generally, sex offender registration laws have been treated as civil regulations, and as such, they are not governed by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 5 0 Nor has the stigma associated with registration been deemed sufficient to constitute punishment 5 1 or a denial of the registrant's due process rights. 52 Labeling the registration scheme as a civil regulation-a bar to a viable challenge under the Eighth Amendment-is one hurdle to overcome. However, more challenging than this legal obstacle is the inability to counter the emotion that grips the debate. 5 3 The impetus to register children, even in the face of compelling arguments and statistics to the contrary, convincingly demonstrates that emotions control the legislative agenda. 54 Part II of this Article frames the clash of policies between the juvenile justice system and SORNA. On one side are the juvenile justice system's long-standing policies to promote rehabilitation and protect the child's privacy interests. 5 6 In direct conflict are SORNA's requirements of mandatory registration of children and public notification of their confidential adjudications. This Part will explore both the legal and emotional reasons why the tension between competing statutory aims has been settled in favor of SORNA.
Part III outlines the devastating and stigmatizing impact of registration and notification on the child offender. It traces the practical implications of life as a child registrant, including the inability of the child to live with family, the bar to future educational goals, the impediment of a career, and most devastating, the ostracism and isolation from peers.
The balance of the Article analyzes child sex offender registration laws within a constitutional framework. Although they are potentially unconstitutional under principles of ex post facto and substantive and procedural due process,5
this Article explores only their constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Part IV argues that child sex offender registration is a criminal penalty cast as a civil regulation and is therefore subject to Eighth of the system). Interestingly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reports that there have been no studies on the effects on public safety following enactment of the laws. See U.S. Gov 59 this Part asserts that child sex offender registration is not a civil regulation because registration is no longer rationally connected to its civil intent. Specifically, with respect to child offenders, child sex offender registration is excessive legislation because it is predicated on the misguided premise that a child's sexual crime signifies future dangerousness as an adult. 6 0 Assuming registration is punishment, Part V makes the case that, under the Eighth Amendment, child registration violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. First, this Part tracks the national consensus against child registration, and then under independent analysis, it demonstrates that automatic registration is excessive legislative drafting. One size does not fit all when it comes to the registration of children who commit sexual offenses.
Compounding the problem is automatic lifetime registration for child offenders. Part V analogizes this practice to juvenile sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida. Mandatory lifetime registration applied to children in the same manner as adult offenders is cruel and unusual punishment because it violates fundamental principles that require sentencing practices to distinguish between adult and child offenders. 6 1 For kids like Leah, J.L., and Jacob C., the 'Scarlet Letter' is not fiction. Nor is it an exaggeration of the stigma and isolation they face on a daily basis. No matter the constitutionality of adult sex offender registration-and on that point, there is debate-this Article concludes that the current system of child sex offender registration is cruel and unusual punishment.
II. COMPETING GOALS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
REGISTRATION OF CHILD SEX OFFENDERS
A delinquency adjudication coupled with the requirement that the child must register as a sex offender is in striking juxtaposition. The adjudication is a confidential resolution combined with an adult and public consequence. The joining of the private and the public is more 59. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (articulating seven factors to be used to determine whether a regulation is punitive).
60. See infra Part V (offering statistics to refute the perception that child offenders recidivate). 61. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (declaring that a mandatory penalty scheme that invokes such a harsh punishment "contravenes Graham (and also Roper's) foundational principle: that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children"). See also infra Part V.B.2 for a detailed discussion of the arguments.
startling when we consider the long-standing history of treating child offenders differently from their adult counterparts.
62
A. Fundamental Tenets of the Juvenile Justice System
From its founding, juvenile court was intended to be different from adult court.
63 Unlike adult court Froceedings, which are adversarial in nature and designed to punish, juvenile court was structured to encourage treatment and rehabilitation. 6 5 In noting the differences between the two systems of justice, Judge Reinhardt wrote in United States v. Juvenile Male that one is "public and punitive ... the other largely confidential and rehabilitative." adult court. In general, the juvenile court considers the following factors: the juvenile's age and social background; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature and success of past treatment efforts; and the availability of programs to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
67
The belief that the juvenile justice system is best able to rehabilitate child offenders is illustrated in the Ohio case of In re C.P., 68 in which the state requested that C.P. be transferred to adult court to face allegations of two counts of rape and one count of kidnapping with sexual motivation. 69 Despite both the seriousness of the charges and a previous adjudication of C.P., when he was eleven years old, for sexually abusing his half-sister, 70 the juvenile court rejected the state's request, stating, "I think we have time within the juvenile system and we have resources within the juvenile system to work with this boy."
Rehabilitation is the cornerstone of the juvenile justice system. In describing its development, the Supreme Court wrote in its landmark decision of In re Gault, 72 "The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness, which [the reformers] observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded." 73 Gault represents one of four cases from the 1960s in which the Supreme Court evaluated the balance of affording the juvenile offender due process rights with the goal of maintaining a nonadversarial system. 74 Although Gault provided juveniles with certain constitutional safeguards reserved for adults, 75 it also upheld the guarantees of 74. See Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that a waiver ofjurisdiction must be attended by due process); Gault, 387 U.S. at 20 (concluding that juveniles were entitled to certain due process rights afforded to adult criminals); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (requiring that a state must show proof beyond a reasonable doubt for acts that would be considered a crime by an adult); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (finding that juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudications).
75. Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-58 (determining that juveniles are entitled to notice of the charges, confidentiality and privacy associated with the juvenile justice system. 6 These safeguards purposefully shield the child offender from the stigma associated with the delinquency adjudication through confidential and private proceedingS 77 and through the expungement of evidence pertaining to the arrest and delinquency. 78 Unlike adult court proceedings, which demand public scrutiny and a public trial because of retributive and penal results, 79 juvenile court proceedings are private and confidential to stimulate rehabilitation and avoid the stigma attached to public condemnation. The child offender's privacy is so zealously protected that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), for example, expressly prohibits the use of the juvenile's record for "employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege" 80 and similarly provides that "neither the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding." 8 ' The belief is that maintaining the privacy of the juvenile offender in proceedings that are confidential enables the juvenile offender to avoid the stigma associated with the delinquency. There is an irony to the juxtaposition of a juvenile court proceeding that is cloaked in the protection of confidentiality and contemporaneous public notification of that child's crime. That irony was not lost on one court:
We also find it ironic that . .. Ohio appellate courts protect the child's privacy and use only the child's initials in the caption or the text. At the same time, however .. . Ohio's AWA automatically requires Tier III juvenile sexual offenders to register and to report to local authorities, which removes all anonymity prior to the outcome of any rehabilitation efforts.
B. A Clash ofPolicies
SORNA's requirement that children in the juvenile justice system must nonetheless register as sex offenders is in obvious opposition to the systems twin precepts: confidentiality and the potential for rehabilitation. It, therefore, sets up a classic legal dilemma with which even law students are familiar-how to reconcile competing statutory aims. On one side is a firmly established codification of judicial philosophy that treats juvenile offenders differently. On the other side is Congress's intent to carve out an exception within the juvenile justice system for children who commit sexual offenses. 84 How might the important policies contained in the FJDA and Congress's desire to require child offenders to register be reconciled? Simply put, they cannot be. Policies of rehabilitation and protection of the child's privacy cannot coexist with the requirements of registration and notification to the community of their delinquency. 85 They cannot coexist because the burdens associated with registration and community notification detrimentally impact a child's chance for rehabilitation. The mandatory registration of J.L., who had consensual sexual intercourse with his underage girlfriend, troubled one justice who wrote, "The mandatory disposition of this case appears to have the opposite avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation" To require a child to register sits in direct opposition to efforts to rehabilitate the child. Consider the words of a child offender who was placed on the registry at fourteen years old: "[O]ur mistake is forever available to the world to see. There is no redemption, no forgiveness. You are never done serving your time. There is never a chance for a fresh start. You are finished. I wish I was executed because my life is basically over." 88 Generally, when statutes are in conflict, canons of statutory construction dictate that the specific will trump the general. 89 Faced with whether to preserve the core of the juvenile justice system or to accede to Congressional intent to make children register, courts have taken the position that confidentiality and rehabilitation must give way to Congress's view that child offenders pose such a danger to the community. 90 On this point, the Family Court of Delaware wrote:
[I]n applying Megan's Laws to juveniles, many States, Delaware being no exception, suddenly appeared to disregard a concept which the American Criminal Justice System, indeed the criminal justice systems adopted in almost every country around the world, had recognized for over 100 years, that juveniles are different from adults and should be treated differently. declaring the primacy of SORNA over conflicting provisions of the FJDA, the court stated:
Our review is limited to interpreting the statutes, and both the statutory text, legislative history and timing of SORNA indicate that its reporting and registration requirements were plainly intended by Congress to reach a limited class of juveniles adjudicated delinquent in cases of aggravated sexual abuse, including Appellant, despite any contrary provisions of the FJDA." Acquiescence to legislative intent is not uncommon. In fact, great deference is afforded to legislative intent to craft parameters of offenses. 9 6 However, as Justice Bell of the Maryland Court of Appeals observed when considering the validity of Maryland's strict liability statutory rape statute, legislative authority does not come with impunity.
There must be occasions where the court observes principles that extend beyond interpreting legislative intent.
C. Emotion that Clouds the Debate
Reliance on formalism to choose among competing statutory aims disregards an underlying but unspoken motivation for the choice. In truth, deference to SORNA's mandatory registration of children is not solely an exercise in statutory construction. It is a choice fueled by emotion.
To be sure, we are afraid of the sexual predator. Images from high profile cases continue to haunt us even as statistics show child sexual abuse declining. 98 Jerry Sandusky is that image. A trusted and respected assistant coach of a major college football team and founder of a youth charity, he preyed on young boys from disadvantaged homes, showering them with attention and gifts. 99 (describing grooming as "the process by which child molesters ingratiate themselves into the communities they wish to exploit").
After a lengthy investigation, Sandusky was convicted of forty-five counts of sexual molestation of ten young boys.' 0 ' Jerry Sandusky is not the only image we have of the serial sexual predator. Philip Garrido, a registered sex offender, is another terrifying image. He abducted Jaycee Lee Dugard in broad daylight on her way to school when she was eleven years old, and he kept her captive for eighteen years, raping her repeatedly. 1 02 In similarly violent fashion, Ariel Castro kidnapped three young women over a three year period, brutalizing them for the next eleven years in his home in a Cleveland suburb before their escape.' 03 This horror is real. These images frighten us and stay with us. So powerful are the "pictures in our heads," political journalist Walter Lippmann wrote that we rely on them to shape our view of the world.1 04 In the case of Ariel Castro, the boarded up and dilapidated home where he repeatedly raped and assaulted the women was such a devastating symbol of the horror these women faced that the house was demolished shortly after Castro was sentenced to prison.' 0 5
Not only does the image of the serial predator haunt us, it spurs us to act.1 06 The separate and tragic deaths of three young children-Adam Walsh in 1981,107 Jacob Wetterling in 1992,10 and Megan Kanka in In fact, it is the singular death of seven year old Megan who was brutally raped and murdered by her neighbor Jesse Timmendequas"l 3 that frightens us the most. The push for community notification laws was an attempt to gain control over the frightening realization that someone previously convicted of the sexual assault of other children could live in a neighborhood without the knowledge of parents in the community.114
Professor Walker Wilson observes that "our desire to exercise control over potential threats is a driving force behind much of human behavior.""' 5 This need to exercise control over terrifying images of violent sexual predators has led us to ramp up sex offender registration and notification schemes over the past decade with a "dizzying array of increased registration and community notification requirements, the emergence of harshening residency restrictions, and the elimination of individuated risk assessment."" 6 As Professor Wayne Logan wrote, "To students of the field, the laws-often enacted unanimously and without meaningful debate-serve as object lessons in legislative panic."ll7 include the requirement that state law enforcement agencies "shall release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section").
112 James Starkey can attest to the increasingly harsh penalties he faced in the ten years since he was required to register as a sex offender."' Goal posts kept moving on James, a signal of the escalating social panic surrounding sex offender registration laws. Initially in 1998, Starkey received a deferred adjudication in Texas to the charge of sexual assault of a fifteen year old." 9 He was required to register for ten years, a term that was subsequently upheld when he moved to Oklahoma a short time later.1 20 That requirement was set to expire in 2008, but because of a serially-amended sex offender registration law, Starkey's crime was recast by the Oklahoma legislature to require lifetime registration just as his obligation was set to end.121
The fear-sometimes real, but sometimes imaginedl 2 2 -has spilled over into our handling of children convicted of sex crimes. 123 Our desire to protect our children from Jerry Sandusky, Philip Garrido, and Jesse Timmendequas has moved us to broaden the reach of sex offender laws to include children in the juvenile justice system. But it has come at the expense of forsaking foundational policies of rehabilitation and confidentiality. Historian Philip Jenkins described the phenomenon as a "social panic" in which the "fear is wildly exaggerated and wrongly directed."l 24 Jenkins wrote:
When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when experts, in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk with one voice of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media representations universally stress sudden and dramatic increases . . . then we believe it is appropriate to speak of a moral panic. 125 Sweeping generalizations and hastily passed legislation are hallmarks of the social panic that surrounds sex offender registration laws. The emotion that grips us leads to registration laws drafted so broadly that they ensnare equally the rapist and the child who engages in consensual sexual intercourse.' 26 Panic causes us to pass registration laws quickly and without much scrutiny. 127 While it is certainly true that a few child offenders demonstrate predatory behavior,1 28 panic also leads us to ignore evidence that child sex offenders are not likely to reoffendl 2 9 or that they commit sexual crimes for a myriad of reasons other than predatory inclinations.1
30
Reliance on legislative deference may be the explicitly stated reason for support of Congressional intent to carve out an exception for child sex offenders in the juvenile justice system. But, by no means is it the only reason. 127. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 117, at 374 (describing how "the Speaker of the Assembly Garabed 'Chuck' Haytaian, running for the U.S. Senate, declared a legislative emergency, bypassing customary committee debate and forcing sex offender registration and community notification proposals to move directly to the floor for consideration").
See infra
128. agreement, even among courts that have held that registration schemes are only civil regulations.' 3 1 Indeed, courts recognize that being publicly labeled a "sex offender" is sufficiently derogatory to severely injure a person's reputation.
132
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summed it up well when it wrote that it could "hardly conceive of a state's action bearing more 'stigmatizing consequences' than the labeling of [an individual] as a sex offender."l 33 Even the term 'stigma,' which has been generally defined as a "mark or token of infamy, disgrace, or reproach," 34 underscores this observation. Therefore, the question is not whether registration is stigmatizing. The question is whether the stigma associated with registration rises to the level of punishment. Certainly, the seminal 2003 Supreme Court opinion in Smith v. Doe provides the framework for this inquiry.' 3 5 The Court found that Alaska's sex offender registration scheme was not sufficiently stigmatizing to be punitive for purposes of an ex post facto analysis under the Eighth Amendment.'
36
From the registrants' perspective in Smith, stigma flowed directly from the shame and humiliation accompanying registration and notification. As such, their argument continued, registration and notification were tantamount to the shaming punishments employed in Colonial times.' 37 However, the Court rejected that contention, writing, "[T]he stigma of Alaska's Megan's Law results not from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a 131. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) ("It must be acknowledged that notice of a criminal conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could have been designed in colonial times."); see also The Court's conclusion that notification is not the equivalent of a shaming punishment was premised on the public nature of an adult trial and the record it produces following a conviction. In fact, it was central to the Court's reasoning. In favoring the constitutionality of notification, the Court wrote, "Our system does not treat the dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate government objective as punishment. On the contrary, our criminal law tradition insists on public indictment, public trial, and public imposition of sentence."' 3 9
But herein lies the problem of applying the Smith rationale to child registration. Unlike adult proceedings, delinquency adjudications are not public. They are purposefully private to prevent stigma that may attach to the child offender into adult years.
14 Stigma flows directly from the notification and not from the delinquency adjudication, which would remain confidential but for the notification requirement. That the public nature of adult criminal proceedings so shaped the Court's reasoning suggests, at a minimum, reconsideration of Smith's applicability to child sex offender registration.
Further, not all stigma is created equal. No matter the impact on adult offenders, Smith did not contemplate the profound shame inflicted on child registrants. One need only consider the practical implications of registration and notification burdens on children to appreciate the truth of it. Registration and notification cast a long and punitive shadow over the registrants' lives as registrants face ever-changing and harshening burdens.
14 1 As the court in In re C.P. observed, "Registration and notification requirements for life, with the possibility of having them lifted only after 25 years, are especially harsh punishments for a juvenile."l juvenile will serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender." 1 43 As well for the juvenile offender who, post-imprisonment, must register as a sex offender. Registration and notification burdens are felt for a longer period of time and in ways more onerous for juveniles than their adult counterparts.
Child sex offender registration triggers residential dislocation,144 educational depravation,1 45 impactful residency restrictions,1 46 and stigmatization and community isolation.1 47 In a compelling essay, Dr. Janis Bremer argues that punitive responses directed at children in the form of isolation and stigmatization "create a negative feedback loop where young people are placed in a one-down dependent position with no hope of regaining a position of equality in society." 48 The feelings expressed by Christian W. encapsulate the devastating experience of child sex offender registration. Christian was fourteen years old when he went on the registry for inappropriately touching his younger cousin. At age twenty-six, Christian said, "I live in a general sense of hopelessness, and combat suicidal thoughts almost daily due to the life sentence [registration] and punishment of being a registrant. The stigma and shame will never fully go away, people will always remember."l 49 Christian W. is not alone in combating thoughts of suicide. For Evan B., those thoughts turned into a reality.
50 He was placed on the state offender registry after exposing himself in a high school bathroom to 145. See DuBuc, supra note 1 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the loss of educational opportunities that Leah DuBuc suffered because she was retroactively placed on the registry).
See infra Part IV (examining the increasingly harsh residency restrictions and their impact on child offenders).
147. For an excellent discussion, see RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10 (reviewing many stories of child offenders whose lives have been severely impacted by registration and notification).
148 several female students. One year later, Evan B. shot and killed himself.'t Sometimes, it is important to articulate the obvious. That is the value of the court's observation in In re C.P. when it wrote, "For a juvenile offender, the stigma of the label of sex offender attaches at the start of his adult life and cannot be shaken. . . . It will be a constant cloud, a once-every-three month reminder to himself and the world that he cannot escape the mistakes of his youth." is articulated,1 63 in the placement of the registration scheme outside the criminal code,1 64 or in language in the statute's preamble demonstrating such intent.' 65 Yet, legislative intent alone is only the first step of analysis to determine that the law is a civil regulation and not a criminal penalty. The second step requires analysis of the effects of the law. Under this analysis, a regulation may be deemed to impose a criminal penalty where the legislation is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose, or where it no longer bears a rational relation to its regulatory aim. Analysis of these factors exposes the constitutional vulnerability of sex offender registration laws as applied to children. While the intent of the scheme is purportedly civil in nature, the effect is not. 
A. An Affirmative Disability Akin to Punishment
Although registration does not share all the attributes of imprisonment, modem registration burdens are, in fact, affirmative disabilities designed to restrict the registrant's liberty. No longer can one claim that registration burdens are benign as was the conclusion reached in Smith with respect to Alaska's sex offender registration scheme from the 1990s. The Smith court found that registration under the Alaskan model did not appear to restrict movement because inperson registration was infrequent and only applied to a small class of registrants.' 68 Additionally, registrants were "free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision."l' 69 Modem registration schemes, however, are different. Modem registration schemes require frequent in-person registration by many classes of registrants.1 70 So burdensome can be the frequency of inperson registration that the Maine Supreme Court stated:
It belies common sense to suggest that a newly imposed lifetime obligation to report to the police station every ninety days to verify one's identification, residence, and school, and to submit to fingerprinting and provide a current photograph, is not a substantial disability or restraint on the free exercise of individual liberty. 17 1 For the child offender, the disability is exacerbated. SORNA's classification of crimes results in automatic frequent in-person registration of all child offenders because of the way SORNA categorizes offenses committed by the child offenders.
172 Frequent inperson registration is not just a possibility; it is the norm. In addition, the duration of registration is far more significant for a child offender than for an adult offender. Since SORNA demands lifetime registration for many juvenile offenders, the number of years a child will suffer inperson registration every three months is a more intrusive burden on a child offender than on an adult offender.1 Modem residency restrictions also contribute significantly to the affirmative disability and restraint on registrants. Current residency restrictions aggressively and essentially close off major portions of a particular state to sex offender registrants, 174 countering Smith's observation that registration does not preclude registrants from changing residences.
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When first introduced, buffer zones were 1,000 feet or less and were limited to traditional locations where children might congregate.1 76 Today, buffer zones are often 2,000 feet or more,' 7 7 and statutes have expanded the concept of "where children congregate" to include bus stops,' 7 8 video arcades,1 7 9 and libraries. 80 One offender recounted the difficulties in honoring the buffer zones:
Because I can't come in contact with anyone under the age of eighteen, I find myself going to the store on a regular basis at night to make sure there are no minors there. It makes me nervous just because if they wave at you or make some look at you, you know you could potentially get in trouble for that. As a result of expanding residency restrictions, numerous registrants have very limited residency options available to them.1 82 Competition among legislators to remove sex offenders from their community has led to a "race to the harshest" in the form of aggressive residency restrictions. 183 Indeed, so little real estate was left in San Diego County following the enactment of Jessica's Law, that experts estimated only 2.3% of residential parcels complied with residency restrictions and were affordable.' 84 One recent example is Southern California's calculated placement of pocket parks that create artificial buffer zones intended to remove sex offenders from their homes. 18 5
B. Excessive Legislation in Relation to Civil Intent
In addition to suggesting that modern registration schemes are affirmative disabilities, this Subpart questions whether sex offender registration schemes still bear a rational relationship to their original civil intent. The sheer weight and scope of current sex offender registration schemes cast doubt on whether this is possible. Modem registration schemes are drafted to cast a net so wide they ensnare those who pose no future danger to the community. 28, 2013) , http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/28/local/la-me-parks-sex-offenders-20130301 (reporting on the construction of pocket parks designed with the express purpose of forcing registrants to move from their homes, and which are so small, they will "barely have room for two jungle gyms, some benches and a brick wall").
186. With schemes that overextend, the regulatory aim of sex offender registration laws no longer appears rationally related to its original purpose. As evidence of this, one need only consider the explosion of registerable offenses post-Smith.' 8 7 From an average of eight offenses that triggered registration in the 1990s to more than forty offenses in some states,' 88 modem sex offender registration laws reach offenders who engage in sexual behavior that would not have been previously considered predatory.' 8 9
Not only are registration schemes broader in scope, they are categorically fixed without individualized assessment of those who may fall outside its purview.1 90 As a consequence, registration laws capture many child offenders who are not likely to reoffend. Justice Ginsburg expressed such a concern when she wrote of the Alaskan sex offender registration scheme: "[T]he Act has a legitimate civil purpose . . . . But its scope notably exceeds this purpose. The Act applies to all convicted sex offenders, without regard to their future dangerousness.""' This is especially problematic for the child offender because SORNA demands that child registrants convicted of certain offenses must register for life.1 92 As a companion to this point, registerable offenses have been reclassified-often without debate-as more serious than previously determined.1 93 The effect has been to recast registrants as more dangerous than their conviction warrants and to impose upon them additional burdens that, according to Mendoza-Martinez's counsel, are (affirming registration despite the concession by the State that the underage girl had misrepresented her age in such a way as to give credibility to Fruge's claim that he believed she was of consenting age). excessive in light of their potential for reoffense. 1 94 With the breadth of registration laws comes the rigid application of those laws to all offenders. Categorical assessment suffers from excessive legislation in that it does not address whether an individual offender's behavior portends future dangerousness. This inflexibility leads to absurd results as it did in J.L.'s case when, at fourteen, he was required to register for life because he engaged in voluntary sexual relations with his twelve-year-old girlfriend. 1 The automatic nature of J.L.'s disposition highlights the danger of a conviction-based assessment devoid of individualized risk assessment.
Absurd results that arise from automatic sex offender registration are not limited to the disposition of child sex offenders. The move from individualized risk assessment to conviction-based assessment has impacted adult registration as well. Three cases stand out, and all for the same reason: the inflexibility of the statute's construction leads to mandatory registration for offenders who are not sexual predators.
In Rainer v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed automatic sex offender registration of an eighteen-year-old male drug buyer who robbed his seventeen-year-old female drug dealer, even though he had no sexual motive.
1 96 According to the court, the statute required Rainer to register as a sex offender because his crime involved a "child victim.
7
With a similarly blind eye to the rationale for registration laws, Dean Edgar Wiesart was required to register as a sex offender in South Carolina for having been convicted of skinny-dipping in a hotel swimming pool in Maryland twenty years earlier.98 His attempt to have a hearing on whether he should have to register was rejected.' 9 Probably the most disturbing is Florida's punitive reaction to Grayson A. who at eighteen had sex with his then-fifteen-year-old girlfriend who
194. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 116-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing that the "duration of the reporting requirement is keyed not to any determination of a particular offender's risk of reoffending, but to whether the offense of conviction qualified as aggravated"). (rejecting sex offender registration for person who stole a car with a sleeping baby inside, but who prosecution conceded had no intent to commit a sexual offense upon the child). Id. at 1215 ("Although the Legislature's concern for protecting our children from sexual predators may be reasonable, however, the application of this statute to a defendant whom the State concedes did not commit a sexual offense is not."). became pregnant. 20 0 Grayson was convicted of "lewd and lascivious molestation," imprisoned for two years, and required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. 20 1 His marriage to his girlfriend did nothing to ameliorate the situation. The toll of registration was enormous: Grayson lost countless jobs, and because his wife was also his victim, he was not allowed to live with her. Two children and thirteen years later, Grayson was only freed of the burdens of registration through political intervention. 2 0 2 He was pardoned and removed from the registry.
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Despite the quickly changing landscape of sex offender registration schemes, Smith remains the prevailing view that sex offender registration laws are rationally related to their civil regulatory intent. Roper, "It is by now beyond serious dispute that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments' is not a static command." 207 As interpretation of the clause evolved, barbaric punishments were replaced with questions of proportionality of the punishment to the crime. 208 However, the Eighth Amendment's essence remains that "[i]ts very function is, at the margins, to prevent the majoritarian branches of government from overreaching and enacting overly harsh punishments." 209 Generally, there are two classifications of punishment to consider: the nature of the offense and length of sentence or the characteristics of the offender.
2 10 To prove that a punishment is cruel and unusual, a court must first consider whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice, and second, "in the exercise of its own independent judgment, whether the punishment violates the constitution." 2 11
A. The National Consensus Against Juvenile Registration
Although national consensus overwhelmingly favors sex offender registration laws, 212 a national majority does not favor the registration of children. 2 1 3 Only in the last decade have sex offender registration schemes exploded with an increased number of registerable offenses, 214 more intrusive registration burdens, 215 expanding reach of notification, introduction of residency restrictions, " and GPS laws. 226 When one combines the reasons for failure to comply with SORNA, the compliance statistics compiled by the General Accounting Office are startling. By February 2013, only nineteen of the fifty-six jurisdictions had substantially implemented SORNA, with only sixteen states meeting compliance.
22
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in its review of the national trend on the lack of compliance, aptly referred to it as "national foot dragging." 2 28
The national trend to reject child sex offender registration is clear if one isolates the statistics according to the reason for noncompliance. Thirty-one of the fifty-two jurisdictions reported that the inclusion of child registration was a hurdle to implementation of SORNA. Twenty of those jurisdictions indicated it was a major challenge to 229 compliance.
Symbolic of the national consensus to resist child registration are explanations by the states of Texas and New York for their refusal to comply with SORNA. In a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice, the General Counsel and Acting Chief of Staff of the Texas Governor wrote, "In dealing with juvenile sex offenders, Texas law more appropriately provides for judges to determine whether registration would be beneficial to the community and the juvenile offender in a particular case." 230 Similarly, from the State of New York, the Director of the Office of Sex Offender Management wrote, "New York has a long standing public policy of treating juvenile offenders differently from adult 226. See, e.g., id. ("Texas is one of the states that classify sex offenders and set their registration requirements based on a risk assessment. SORNA, instead, has states using a three-tier classification system based solely upon the offense.... [W]ork in Texas to narrow the sex offender registry to those who are most likely to be dangerous would be undone by SORNA's rules."). 
See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-211, OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
B. Through the Lens ofIndependent Judicial Review
Whether national consensus favors a particular trend in sentencing is only one aspect of the analysis. Separately, the court must entertain an independent review of whether the sentence is cruel and unusual punishment. 2 33 On this point, one theme emerges: similar treatment of child and adult offenders violates fundamental principles that require sentencing practices to distinguish between the two groups of offenders.
The Flaw in Automatic Child Registration: One Size Does Not Fit All
Automatic conviction-based registration for adults may be grounded in greater legitimacy than automatic conviction-based registration for children. That is because of the obvious truth that children are different from adults. A child's actions and accompanying reasoning cannot be so easily classified. In this case, one size does not fit all.
As the Supreme Court wrote, a child's youth is far "more than a chronological fact." 234 On how to give context to those words, the Supreme Court trilogy of Roper, Graham, and Miller provides important guidance on the appropriate distinctions that must be drawn in the treatment of adult and child offenders. At its heart, the trilogy signified that sentencing practices must account for key distinctions that separate adult and child offenders.
To determine whether the sentence of death was appropriate for a juvenile, the Court in Roper isolated certain characteristics that separated children from their adult counterparts. The first characteristic is that children have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility." tendency than adults to make decisions involving sexual conduct based on emotions, such as anger or fear, rather than any2 V'redetermined trait that predicts the child's future sexual dangerousness. 6 Additionally, the Court found that children are more vulnerable to negative and external pressures,237 an important factor when one considers that sexual offenses by children are often committed while in groups. 2 38 Because they are more susceptible to peer pressure, children are also less able "to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting." 239 Finally, children do not have fully formed characters or identities. With less fixed personality traits, children have the potential to mature and form a settled identity. 240 Thus, there is great possibility for a child "with even the most depraved characteristics to be rehabilitated." 24 1
Interestingly, these three traits not only impact a child's decisionmaking process of whether to initiate a sexual crime, these traits are as likely the explanation for why children do not reoffend. Growth in maturity, change in situational and environmental factors, and greater impulse control all help to explain why child sex offenders have very low recidivism rates. 242 Unfortunately, the public's desire to compel child registration is fueled by a faulty assumption that children who commit sexual offenses are likely to reoffend as adults. 243 Once a sex offender always a sex offender. This assumption calls to mind a similar viewpoint regarding the ability to forecast whether a child will become an adult serial murderer. According to some psychological studies, adult serial murderers demonstrate propensity to serial violence when they are children because of certain behaviors they exhibited or environmental factors they suffered. 24 sexual act is nonconsensual, it does not necessarily signify future dangerousness. In Joshua G.'s case, his act of inappropriately touching his nine-year old sister was in direct response to his being repeatedly raped between the ages of six and eight by neighborhood children. 252 His inability to control the environment combined with his immaturity led to his acting out. As he explains now, "Everything that I did with my sister came directly from the things I had experienced in the abuse. I was sexually confused, and it started to play out with my sister." 253 Given the low recidivism rates among child offenders, one sees the inherent inequities of an automatic registration scheme that ensnares the nonreoffending child with the small percentage of children who will become sexual predators. 2 54 On this point, the research is clear. A child offender's actions are impelled by "more varied and more complicated" reasons than the simplistic idea that the offender is a serial predator in the making. 255 Noted scholar Professor Franklin Ziniring argues that empirical evidence supports the proposition that child offenders do not fit a single stereotypic model. He instructs that, at a minimum, they fall into three general categories: "first-time offenders," who engage in force or coercion, but who will generally not reoffend; "status offenders," who engage in consensual, but unlawful, sexual activity with peers close in age; and "repeat offenders," only a small percentage of whom will grow into sexual predators. 25 6 In addition to these three categories, sometimes unlawful sexual activity by children is a matter of "opportunity and hormones." 257 A sentiment, perhaps, that is embodied in the statement from Miller when it expressed significant concerns with mandatory sentencing schemes that did not take into account factors that are particular to children, including a juvenile's "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to With such varied reasons for a child's commission of sexual acts, the automatic categorical assessment, or a one-size-fits-all approach, is a flawed model. 259 Rather than automatic conviction-based categorical assessment that treats all child offenders alike, Professor Zinring argues that we need to develop a solid database to predict the small subset of juvenile offenders who will become future predators. 260 The State of Texas would agree. In refusing to comply with SORNA, the State of Texas underscored the concern over categorical assessment when it wrote, "Texas is one of the states that classify sex offenders and set their registration requirements based on a risk assessment.... Work in Texas to narrow the sex offender registry to those who are most likely to be dangerous would be undone by SORNA's rules." 26 1
The Supreme Court of Ohio's examination of automatic registration
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in In re C.P. is also instructive on the issue. Of great concern to the court was that the child offender was automatically labeled a Tier III offender for the commission of certain offenses. 26 The court was also concerned that automatic registration precluded exercise of discretion by juvenile court judges, which is critical to ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. The court wrote, "The disposition of a child is so different from the sentencing of an adult that fundamental fairness to the child demands the unique expertise of a juvenile judge." 265 The Supreme Court of Ohio has been joined by the Supreme Court of Indiana. When faced with whether to condone the automatic registration of a child offender, the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that a sentence of 52.5 years was the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because of the unlikelihood that the sixteen-year-old offender would see the opportunity for release in his lifetime, or if released, he would be at such an advanced age. 279 Can the same rationale underlying Caballero and Null be extended to mandatory lifetime registration? Although the trilogy of Roper, Graham, and Miller pertained to sentencing practices, the Court's evaluation of the appropriateness of those sentences applies equally to mandatory lifetime registration of child sex offenders. Mandatory lifetime sex offender registration shares many of the same characteristics of the sentences that caused concern in Graham, Caballero, and Null.
Like those punishments, lifetime sex offender registration is an irrevocable judgment devoid of rehabilitative hope. This observation is not dramatic license. It gives credence to the feelings shared by child registrants who feel the hopelessness and despair arising from their registration and the bleakness they experience in their future. 280 The observation also precisely describes the sanctioned practice of requiring lifetime sex offender registration for an eleven-year-old boy, which was upheld in In re J.R.Z.
2 8' Such judgment of an eleven-yearold boy shows that the system never intended to offer the child rehabilitative hope. In fact, this was the central point of the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in In re C.P. when it overturned mandatory lifetime registration for child offenders under the rationale of Graham. 282 The court reasoned that no penalogical justification exists for the imposition of such a harsh penalty on a child, for whom such a pronouncement "will define his adult life before it has a chance to truly UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW begin." 283 Mandatory lifetime registration for children also evokes Miller's warning that to be considered constitutional, harsh punishments must arise from sentencing practices that consider the differences between adults and children.2
The lack of discretion to consider differences between adult and child offenders is at odds with the core reasoning of Graham and Miller. Mandatory lifetime registration also does not provide an avenue for the child to show eligibility for removal from the registry. 2 85 Even where an avenue for removal is statutoril' authorized, the mechanism in place makes it very difficult to do so. 86 In that regard, the words "meaningful opportunity," 287 from Graham, take on special importance. As the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned in State v. Dyer when it deleted the statutorily imposed restriction on parole eligibility, "meaningful opportunity" under Graham cannot be based on an ad hoc decision-making process.
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One is also reminded that removal from the registry can never fully remove the stigma. The case of one child registrant serves as an example. He committed suicide only months after being removed from the registry, 289 an act his mother explained in the following way, "Everyone in the community knew he was on the sex offender registry, it didn't matter to them that he was removed." person may petition a court for removal of the designation as an offender and for removal of all personal information from the public registry website by filing a petition in the appropriate court, and that the court may summarily deny the petition or give notice to the appropriate authorities to set the matter for hearing (May 8, 2013) , http://sacurrent.com/news/in-texas-juvenile-sex-offenders-getvirtual-life-sentence-1.1484813 (discussing the impact of sex offender registration laws on a young man who committed suicide months after he was removed from the registry).
290. Id.
AGAINST JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
At first blush, registration may not seem to fit the parameters of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. But on further reflection, one cannot escape the conclusion that mandatory registration for life shares sufficiently similar features, and thus, lifetime registration for child offenders is unconstitutional under the reasoning of Graham and Miller.
VI. CONCLUSION
Scrutiny of child sex offender registration laws places front and center the issue of what it means to judge our children. And on that issue, we are failing. The public's desire to punish children appears fixed despite our understanding that child sexual offenders pose little danger of recidivism, possess diminished culpability, and have the capacity for rehabilitation.
The best avenue for change resides in the courts' reexamination of the constitutionality of such practices. This Article has demonstrated that at least one constitutional challenge is viable: child sex offender registration laws are unconstitutionally punitive under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
